Data and methods

Measuring accuracy
Many errors analyzed in this chapter depend on the size of population subgroups. To facilitate comparison between regions and over time, most of the measures presented here are relative errors, such as the percentage error (PE) or the absolute percentage error (APE). PE is defined as PE = (forecast -observation) x 100 /observation. Thus, a positive PE indicates that the forecast was too high, and a negative value reflects an underestimation. When we know the errors in a series of forecasts, we can compute mean errors. The mean percentage error (MPE) provides an average measure of bias: a positive MPE indicates that forecasts tended to be too high on average, and a negative MPE reflects forecasts that were too low. When forecast results are not size dependent (e.g., crude birth rate) the term (mean) error is used, and this error is defined as the forecast minus the observed value. Absolute errors ignore the direction of the error. They indicate forecast accuracy by telling how much the forecast went wrong, irrespective of whether it was too high or too low.
UN projections between 1950 and 1985
The 12 UN forecasts that were analyzed are listed in Table 1 UN projections are based on the cohort-component approach for all countries of the world, except for those with a population size of under 150,000. A base population by sex and five-year age group is exposed to an assumed set of mortality and fertility rates, and to net immigration numbers by age and sex. This leads to numbers of deaths, births, and net migrants for the first five projection years, and these numbers are used to update each sex-age group in the base population to find the next age group five years later. Repeated application results in projections of population size and age groups every fifth year and projections for demographic indicators for continuous five-year periods. Four variant assumptions are formulated for fertility in each country (high, medium, low, and constant). Mortality has only one variant, and migration usually also one variant. ' Compared to the situation in the 1950s, the projections have expanded in regional and age detail, in time coverage, and in methodological sophistication (El-Badry and Kono 1986; Frejka 1994: 7). For instance, Africa was absent from the 19501 series, because of the unreliability or even lack of data. Country detail was available only for Latin America and the Far East. The 195011 series attempted to derive country projections from the projected totals in each of the 25 regions. A more innovative series was produced in the 1950111 projections, based on the theory of demographic transition and on stable population theory.
The 1960 and 1965 series used stable and quasi-stable population theory and indirect estimation methods to estimate basic indicators from incomplete data. Available computer facilities made it possible to prepare the 1965 projections by age and sex for each country, and to compute a large number of other indicators. Various sets of model schedules for fertility, mortality, and migration were applied. Backward projections, starting from the base year 1965 and going back to 1950, were also prepared for each country.
These developments continued into the 1970s. More detailed indicators were computed; the complex link between socioeconomic, political, and cultural factors in fertility and mortality change was taken into account; and baseline data were improved. Finally, in the 1980s, the cycle of revisions was shortened from every five years to every two years. In the 1990s better software for projections permitted staff in the Population Division of the United Nations to try many fertility, mortality, and migration assumptions. The findings in the following sections illustrate to what extent these gradual improvements in projection approach have resulted in increased accuracy.
For most forecasts, the United Nations has computed more than one variant, typically a high, a medium, a low, and a constant variant. In such cases I limited the analysis to the medium variant, as this is the one users most often select as the best guess. Since the focus in this chapter is on comparative accuracy across regions and over time, the choice of the medium variant is not likely to have had a major impact upon the conclusions.
Observed population numbers
Observed population numbers have been taken from UN (1994) .2 The United Nations prefers to speak of "estimates" instead of "observations." This is understandable, because the UN continuously revises previously published demographic numbers for many countries, as new data become available and better techniques are developed. However, to avoid confusion with the notions of "projection" and "forecast," the word "observation" will be used here instead of "estimate."3
The frequent revision of observed data poses a problem. It has direct implications not only for the accuracy of the base population, but indirectly also for population growth in the period prior to the base year, and probably in the first few projection years as well (Inoue and Yu 1979 
A correction method
The disadvantage is, of course, that this creates an error in the base population. In some cases the revision has been so large that the base-year error dominates errors in subsequent years. Moreover, the base-year errors are strongly age dependent, and the errors propagate through the age structure in later years. As a consequence, an observed forecast error in the age structure after, say, five years into the forecast period is the result of two error sources: 1) the initial error in the base-year population, caused by bad data quality, and 2) an error caused by wrong assumptions on fertility, mortality, and migration during the five-year period since the base year. I simply assumed that the observed error is the sum of these two. In this way I could isolate the error due to wrong assumptions, by subtracting the error in the base population from the observed forecast error. In the following sections, both corrected and uncorrected percentage errors in the age structure will be analyzed. Mean errors in the age structure for the world as a whole and for the seven regions have been calculated. Forecasts with base years 1950 and 1960 had very little age detail and are therefore omitted. For each age group, the mean error was taken over the subsequent forecasts, controlling for forecast duration. Thus mean errors are presented for the base population and for the age structure at forecast durations of five years and ten years ahead. Results for a duration of 15 years have also been computed, but these are not analyzed here, as they are based on two or three observations only. ages over 40 are much smaller. After correction for bias in the base population resulting from bad data quality, the age structure errors caused by wrong fertility and mortality assumptions become less than one percent in absolute value. Note that age groups 0-4, 5-9, and 80+ in Figure 4 have larger errors at a duration of ten years ahead than five years ahead. In other words, fertility and mortality assumptions become more uncertain when forecast duration increases. The effect is even stronger for developed countries as seen below.6 Errors for the elderly are caused by wrong mortality assumptions; those for children are caused by wrong assumptions for fertility and infant mortality. Therefore I analyzed errors in assumed crude birth rates (CBR) and assumed crude death rates (CDR). Data on the CBR and CDR forecasts have been published, or could be constructed, for ten forecasts and all seven major regions. Other indicators, such as the total fertility rate (TFR) and the life expectancy at birth, are to be preferred for the analyses (at least in principle), because they are independent of the age structure. Hence errors in the forecasts of the TFR or of life expectancy are not influenced by errors in the forecasts of age structures. But the necessary data have only been found for eight forecasts (1965 , 1970 . Errors in the life expectancy at birth will be presented in the concluding section. Those in the TFR will not be discussed here, as preliminary analyses showed that the overall behavior in these errors was not very different from that in the CBR. Apparently, the influence of errors in the age structures on those in the TFR has been small. Table 2 presents the errors in crude death rates in ten forecasts for the world as a whole. The 1950I forecast is not included. It built on vital rates continuing at the 1946-48 level, which led to CDR forecasts of between 2.2 and 2.5 percent for the whole forecast period. The 1950III forecast was the first one, as far as could be traced, that had an explicit extrapolation for mortality. The rates apply to the eight five-year periods from 1950-55 to 1985-90. There are three (dependent) dimensions in the errors for a given region: the calendar year or period for which the errors have been computed, the base year, and the forecast duration (calendar year of observation minus base year). Therefore three types of averages are presented: First we note that all errors in Table 2 are positive.8 Hence real mortality levels were always lower than projected ones. In the 1950III round of forecasts, the crude death rate was assumed to fall slowly, from 2. In principle, one would expect it to be easier to extrapolate mortality than fertility-after all, everyone dies exactly once, and the only uncertainty connected to mortality is around the timing of death, whereas for fertility we have to guess not only the timing (mean age at childbearing), but also the number of children a woman has. Yet, the overall mean absolute error (MAE) in the CBR is 0.23 percentage points, which is almost equal to that for the CDR (0.22 percentage points, see Table 2 ). This suggests that it has been equally difficult to give accurate extrapolations for mortality and fertility for the period and forecasts studied in this chapter. The poor quality of vital data, in particular for Africa and Asia in the 1950s, explains this counterintuitive finding. Tables and figures similar to Tables 2 and 3 and Figures 2 and 4 have been produced for all seven major regions, and for China, India, and the United States. A few of them will be presented below, and the other major findings will be summarized. Detailed results are available from the author upon request.
The world
Africa
Young adults (20-40) and older age groups (55-80) have been underestimated in African forecasts since 1965. Figure 5 shows the mean percentage error (MPE) for forecasts of age structures five and ten years ahead, together with the MPE for the base populations. The pattern is mildly sloping downward with advancing age (except for age group 80+). When we correct for errors that are already present in the base population, the resulting error pattern becomes almost flat at a level close to zero (figures not shown here). Hence the pattern in the MPE in Figure 5 has been caused mainly by errors in the base populations, and much less so by wrong fertility and mortality assumptions in the forecasts. Table 4 shows that Africa's mean error in crude death rates is much higher than that in crude birth rates. This is entirely due to the 1950III forecast, for which the death rate shows an excessively large error. On the other hand, fertility assumptions in the 1950III forecast were much more accurate. Apparently, the paucity of data had a larger impact on mortality than on fertility assumptions.
Asia
Asian forecasts since 1965 have a pronounced error pattern for the age groups over 40, as seen in Figure 6a . After correction for errors in the base population (Figure 6b ), the errors for this age group are more than halved, indicating that wrong mortality assumptions have had less impact than wrong base population data. Numbers of children below age 15 have been underestimated. One explanation is too low fertility rates in the five forecasts beginning with 1975II, for which the mean error in crude birth rates has been -0.08 percentage points.'0 The birth rates in the five forecasts from 1950III to 1975I were far too high (so that the overall error in crude birth rates became +0.26 percentage points; see Table 4 
The former Soviet Union
There are two striking features in the error patterns of forecasts for the former Soviet Union in Figures 9a and 9b . First, the errors are much more irregular than those for other regions, both before and after correction for base population errors. A possible explanation is a sudden recent improvement in data quality. The United Nations notes the problems with mortality data in particular (United Nations 1995: 25). Second, there is a sub- 
Conclusions and recommendations
An overall assessment of the quality of the United Nations population projections should include more aspects than just their accuracy. For instance, the strength of these projections is that they contain detailed results for each country of the world computed on the basis of one consistent methodology, and that they are updated frequently in the light of the most recent data and methods. For an appropriate appreciation of these findings, one has to remember that not only the forecasts, but also data on actual population trends are uncertain. Future revisions for countries with poor data for the period 1950-90 may lead to different conclusions.
How can knowledge of these errors observed for historical forecasts be applied when one tries to assess the uncertainty connected to the current or future forecasts made by the United Nations? Can we simply assume that forecasting today is as difficult as it was in the past, and use the historical errors? At first sight, this would be too conservative. After all, there is a clear improvement in accuracy over time. Baseline errors have become less important for developing countries, and for the developed countries there is no sign that the sharp fall in birth rates that occurred in the 1960s and 1970s will repeat itself, or that it will be reversed. Yet we have to be prepared for surprises. The UN projections, like most projections produced by official agencies, are surprise-free. They are based on an assumption of steady social and economic development. In reality we have seen that unanticipated trends can suddenly appear. The decline in life expectancy in Central and Eastern Europe is an example. Migration from countries affected by war, famine, or simply unfavorable economic development is another case in point. Therefore it would be good to keep the historical errors in mind when we make a best guess of the predictability of the world's population. Simply considering the UN's low, medium, and high variants is not enough, as these do not take account of errors in mor-38 UNITED NATIONS WORLD POPULATION PROJECTIONS tality, migration, or base population data-only uncertainty around fertility levels is included. This leads to the following recommendation. The United Nations ought to include more than one variant for mortality in the projections. A comparison between observed and projected life expectancies at birth in Table 5 shows that mortality assumptions, with the exception of the 1985II series, have been too pessimistic. But there was no systematic lag between observed and projected values. For instance, the life expectancies contained in the 1965 projections come closest to observed ones, whereas those of the projections with base years between 1970 and 1985I are much lower. As late as 1985I, the underestimation was 1.5 years for the period 1985-90. Two years later when the 1985II projections were prepared, the assumed level was suddenly too high by 0.9 years. In summary, Table 5 Thus difficulties with extrapolation together with considerable impact on the results necessitate the use of several sets of mortality assumptions, for instance a low, medium, and high set of life expectancies. This can be implemented quite easily, as shown by the practice of national agencies in several countries.'4 High, medium, and low sets of projection results can be prepared for each country by combining high fertility with high life expectancy, medium fertility with medium life expectancy, and low fertility with low life expectancy.'5 Then the high and low projection variants can still be "thought to bracket the probable range of future population change 
